Minding Bodies: Demons, Masks, Archetypes, and the Limits of Culture by Emigh, John
Spring 2011                                                                                                           125
Minding Bodies: Demons, Masks, Archetypes, and the Limits of 
Culture
John Emigh
The standard social science models—especially as taken up by the 
humanities—have had trouble allowing both for cross-cultural communication 
and for diversity and individual agency within culturally defined regions. Peggy 
Phelan once remarked that performance “exists as a negotiation between biology 
and culture.”1 As a theatre director and teacher by training and trade with research 
interests in Asia and Latin America, I have found that attention to some of the 
concerns and findings of cognitive neuroscience can provide a reality check on 
the rhetoric of the emergent field of performance studies, with its vital links to 
anthropology and cultural studies. 
What is the role and what are the limits of “culture” in neural processing? 
And how are these germane to performance? Gerald Edelman has shown how 
central categorical constructions are to the workings of our ever-shifting neural 
networks; surely, the relative strength of taboos and the strength of binaries used 
in categorical construction vary from place to place and time to time.2 Bradd Shore 
has argued for a reassessment of the ways in which “cultural models” embodied 
in cognitive patterns encourage “a significant overlap [among individuals] within 
a community as to how novel experiences will be reconstituted as memory,” with 
nurture becoming nature.3 Granting this as a possibility, I propose to tease out 
some of the limitations and functions of cultural constructs while considering a 
phenomenon that seems to transcend culture: the “archetype” of the demonic face 
and its mirror opposite, the apotropaic (protective) face, as encountered in masks 
and mask-like images around the world.
In place after place and time after time, masks and sculpted faces have been 
deployed that feature bulging eyes, full lips, flared nostrils, bared fangs, and, 
frequently, distended tongues. The Gorgoneion of Greece, Rangda and Bhoma 
of Bali, Kirtimukha of South and Southeast Asia, Shakti figures of India, enraged 
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Boddhisatvas of Tibet, certain 
Iroquois False Faces of North 
America, the fierce generals of the 
Anshun Earth Opera of China, the 
auspicious Shi-shi Mai of Japan 
and festival dragons of China, 
the jaguars and goddesses of old 
Mexico/new Spain, the Xue Xue 
of the Northwest Coast Kwakiutl, 
and variants of the Devil and Witch 
found throughout Europe and the 
Americas all fit this description 
(see figs. 1 and 2). There are, 
of course, other masks in these 
locales, and routes of transmission 
can be speculated about and have 
sometimes been determined. Still, 
this approach to incorporating 
certain images into masks is not only 
broadly distributed, it frequently 
reappears after periods of absence. 
What, then, accounts for the appeal 
and staying power of these images? 
Why do they occur and reoccur with 
such frequency? And in such various 
contexts! 
The masks tend to be quite 
large and, when worn, are out of 
proportion with the trunk of the 
body as perceived by the visual 
system. They often blend human 
traits with those of powerful beasts 
of prey: lion, tiger, bear, or jaguar. 
Sometimes the references are more 
fanciful: the dragon, the chimera, and 
the Warner Brothers’ “Tasmanian 
Devil” (see figs. 3, 4, and 5). Studies 
of visual tracking indicate that the 
eye focuses obsessively on the 
mouth, nose, and eyes to “read” a 
human face, perhaps to glean the 
Fig. 1. Terracotta Gorgon Relief, Archaic Greece , 625-
600 BCE (Courtesy Museo Archeologico Regionale 
Paolo Orsi, Siracusa, Sicily, Italy) 
Fig. 2. Mask of Kali on an unfinished statue, Andhra 
Pradesh, India (© John Emigh)
Fig. 3. Vishnu’s man-lion avatar, Narasimha, in a 
Prahlada Nataka performance, Ganjam, Orissa, India 
(© John Emigh)
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disposition of the other.4 These 
masks and mask-like images almost 
always exaggerate such features 
through a process of simplification 
and amplification related to the 
“peak shift” phenomenon that 
V. S. Ramachandran associates 
with artistic process.5 Yet their 
expressions, while often suggesting 
ferocity, do not correspond (as other 
masks frequently do) to any of the 
recognizable sets of characteristics 
that have been identified with 
displays of “primary” human 
emotions as identified by Ekman 
and his associates: the eyes are too 
enlarged and the mouth pulled back 
too far for anger; the nostrils are too 
flared for fear; the characteristic 
distended tongue matches neither 
anger nor fear; and sometimes a 
trace of mirth seems present.6 Art 
historian David Napier suggests that 
the arresting presence of leonine 
apotropaic faces found on shields in 
ancient Greece and the Kirtimukha 
figures that adorn temple gateways 
and fea ture  prominent ly  in 
exorcistic performances of South 
and Southeast Asia can, in part, be 
traced precisely to this ambiguity of 
emotional affect (see figs. 6 and 7).7
While they do not seem to depict 
any stable human emotion, Oohashi 
Tsutomu points out that these masks 
do bear a striking resemblance to 
the “threat display” as identified 
by ethologists: the transitory expression made in response to danger—all senses 
alert, caught between fear and fury—that serves as a warning and may precede a 
ferocious attack, or, for that matter, a grudging retreat.8 One striking transposition 
of this threat display onto the human face is in the Maori warrior or All Blacks 
Fig. 4. Barong Ket in a Calonarang performance, Bali, 
Indonesia (© John Emigh)
Fig. 5. The Warner Brothers’ Looney Tunes character, 
“Taz” The Tasmanian Devil, pictured on gift-wrapping 
paper (Courtesy Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc.)
Fig. 6. Decorative Lintel with Kirtimukha figure and 
Shiva, Angkor Thom, Cambodia, Twelfth Century CE 
(© John Emigh)
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rugby player’s fearsome grimace, 
made with the eyes bulged out and 
tongue protruded (see figs. 8 and 9).
While the mimicry of threat 
displays—especially those of 
powerful predators—may well 
account for some of the widespread 
appeal these figures have (or at least 
their power to arrest attention) as 
well as the mixed feelings that 
they engender, Napier briefly 
proposes another possibility.9 
Apotropaic figures characteristically 
exaggerate all the instruments 
for gaining sensory information: 
eyes, ears, nostrils, tongue, and 
fingers are commonly rendered 
larger than “natural.” Not only 
are all of Rangda’s sensory organs 
exaggerated in her oversized face, 
but her fingers, too, are extended 
by the use of gloves with grotesque 
nails of buffalo horn; and this 
extension of the fingers is not unique 
to Rangda (see fig. 10). The same 
technique is sometimes deployed, 
for example, in the costuming of 
Inuit shamans. Whatever else they 
may convey, the images of Rangda, 
the Kirtimukha, and many similar 
images distributed across the globe, 
may well draw their power and 
appeal from a particular resonance 
with the human brain’s monitoring of bodily sensation. 
Through signals arising from touch and movement, the rest of the body is 
continually monitored by the brain. Antonio Damasio has suggested a simple 
demonstration of this constant monitoring and argues for its primacy in establishing 
an initial basis for selfhood.10 The demonstration entails first looking right and left 
without moving the head; then making the same motion while being conscious of the 
movement of the eyes within the sockets. This is easily done, and the point is that these 
feedback sensations are always present but usually do not arrest conscious attention. 
Fig. 8. Drawing showing the changes in musculature 
during the threat display of an ape (Courtesy Oohashi 
Tsutomu).
Fig. 7. Bhoma’s face and hands on the lintel of a temple 
gate, Bali, Indonesia (© John Emigh)
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As has been long established, 
though, this monitoring of the body 
is not done democratically. Graphic 
reconstructions of the proportionate 
neuronal representation accorded 
parts of the body within the 
somatosensory area of the brain’s 
neocortex yield a “homunculus” 
with a tiny body and huge face, 
hands, and tongue (see fig. 11).  
The various images of the 
“homunculus” found in textbooks 
ultimately derive from the seminal 
studies of Wilder Penfield and 
T. Rasmussen, first published 
in  1950,  which mapped the 
proportionate dedication of neurons 
to various body parts in topographic 
representations within the brain.11 
At least ten different somatotopic 
representations of the body have 
now been detected, each with 
discrete sets of neurons involved in 
monitoring different modalities of 
sensory information—movement, 
pressure, temperature, pain—in 
both the right and left hemispheres.12 
While there are some variations, 
these somatotopic representations 
are quite similar. The image most 
frequently shown specifically 
represents the area in the neocortex 
that monitors and mediates motion 
in the right hemisphere of the 
brain—the same hemisphere that 
is most strongly associated with 
affective response, metaphoric 
thought, and artistic activity. The 
graphic representation of this 
“homunculus” was more vivid than 
the one constructed for the adjacent somatosensory cortex itself, though very similar 
Fig. 9. Maori Kapa Haka, the moment of pukana, 
Rotorua, New Zealand-Aotearoa (Adapted from a 
photo by Jasja van Leeuwen and used courtesy of the 
photographer)
Fig. 10. Rangda in performance, Bali, Indonesia (© 
John Emigh)
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to it in its proportions. It also has the 
advantage of being more unisexual, 
and (likely for both of these reasons) 
is often substituted for that of the 
somatosensory homunculus. This 
accounts for the puzzling lack of 
representation for genitalia (see fig. 
12).13 Universalists, beware!
The complexly gendered 
Rangda and her many cousins 
around the world all share these 
oddly proportioned features.14 If, 
as Stephen Snow (among others) 
has suggested, these demonic 
and demon-like figures have an 
“archetypal” appeal, then that 
appeal may lie not so much in the 
genetic transmission of universal 
and cultural archetypes (as Jung 
suggested), but in an intuitive 
projection of the somatosensory 
structures themselves as revealed, 
not though our visual assessment of 
the world, but through our constant, 
hierarchized monitoring of our own 
bodies as they move and encounter 
the world beyond the self. Rangda 
and her relatives, then, may be 
first and foremost images of raw, 
unsocialized sensation as prefigured 
in Damasio’s “body-minded brain” 
(see fig. 13).15 
The somatosensory cortex 
sends the information received out to the posterior parietal cortex, where integration 
with other sensory information—including information from the visual system—
takes place, and a more complete “overall picture of the body” is formed.16 It 
should not be surprising, then, once the importance of the sensory information 
gleaned through other sense organs is factored in, that the eyes, ears, and nose 
would be represented as much larger in apotropaic masks than in a homunculus 
representing the somatosensory or motor area alone. A frontal drawing following 
the proportions indicated and modified by the further elaboration of the features 
Fig. 11. The “Homunculus” assembled, side view, from 
Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science 373 (Courtesy 
McGraw-Hill Companies)
Fig. 12. Homunculus representing the proportionate 
attention given to various parts of the body in the human 
brain’s motor cortex [First published in Timothy Teyler, 
A Primer in Psychobiology: Brain and Behavior (San 
Francisco: W. H Freeman, 1975) 47 (courtesy W. H. 
Freeman Publishers)
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so important for sight, smell, and 
hearing would produce an image 
shaped very much like the Indian 
Kirtimukha and Balinese Rangda: all 
head and hands, with bulging eyes, 
flared nostrils, and a very prominent 
tongue. Perhaps significantly, this is 
precisely what my then five-year-old 
son Aaron “naively” recorded when 
he first encountered Rangda in 1975 
(see fig. 14).17 
More generally, the sensory 
information from the brain’s 
monitoring of the body is also 
integrated with associational areas 
of the cortex dealing with categorical 
constructions and with memories 
that are, in turn, linked (through the 
limbic system) to emotional cues. 
These links are part of the series of 
reentrant loops described by Erich 
Harth, among others, as an optimizing 
system deployed in the mind’s 
perpetual scanning of information for 
“meaning.”18 No wonder, then, that this 
particular representation of the body, 
though at considerable variance from 
the information given by the visual 
system itself, would have its own 
persuasiveness, and that variations 
might appear in cultures that seem to 
have had little direct contact. But no 
wonder, too, that the values associated 
with that image would be subject 
to wide variation, both across and 
within “cultures,” as the body-minded 
brain tests out its multiple drafts of 
meaning and, as Harth suggests, the 
plastic and performing arts provide 
public screens for the continuation 
of this private associational process.19 While there seem to be certain archetypal 
Fig. 13. Shiknidhal, a Gamira dance mask representing 
a dangerous local deity, Dinajpur, West Bengal, India 
(Courtesy Sisir Najumdar)
Fig. 14. Rangda as drawn by Aaron Emigh, age five, 
1975 (© John Emigh)
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(or at least extremely widespread) 
attributes shared by demonic and 
apotropaic masks worldwide, the 
values—positive and negative—
attached to these images vary greatly 
from one culture to another and from 
occasion to occasion and person to 
person within cultures. 
The thoughts here were originally 
shared in a PowerPoint presentation 
as part of the conference “From the 
Brain to Human Culture: Intersections between the Humanities and Neuroscience” 
convened by John Hunter at Bucknell University in April 2007. While delivering 
the talk, I took the opportunity to demonstrate at this juncture the traditional 
performance of one such mask—that of the unfortunate Dalem Bedahulu of Bali. 
In the chronicles that support the masked dance-drama (Topeng) of Bali, Dalem 
Bedahulu (King Different-head), the last king of the Pejeng dyanasty in the 
fourteenth century, literally lost his head while demonstrating his superiority to 
the forces of life and death. A very nervous servant replaced the king’s head with 
that of a wild boar (see fig. 15).20 The mask used in the dance-drama representing 
the story presents a striking amalgam of human and animal features: tongue 
distended, pig-like nostrils flared, and eyes opened wide. In performance, the 
fingers are extended with the same buffalo horn nails used for Rangda and splayed 
wide: the feet are wide apart and in “fourth position” with the big toes raised; the 
legs are open with the pelvis exposed; the dancer’s energy is centered in the groin 
and chest areas; and snorts alternate with archaic war cries: “Irakaaaah! Warahan, 
Warahan!” Besides conforming well to the archetypal image being considered, 
Dalem Bedahulu also has his own complex narrative of strength and hubris—one 
central to Balinese cultural history—and this, too, would come into play in the 
hermeneutics of Balinese audience members, assisted by a unique shaping of the 
narrative by the dancer/narrator(s).
Rangda, too, is not simply an image of the body run amuck. Almost always 
performed by an adult male, her monstered femininity and her frequent narrative 
role as enraged “widow” (the literal meaning of Rangda) provides an occasion 
for confronting and, perhaps, containing the strains in gender politics within 
Balinese life.21 Wild and violent in trance, she is also (in concert with her sometime 
opponent, the lion-like Barong Ket), a protector of the village within the Balinese 
chthonian temple; and even when cast as villain, her forces are pitted against 
those who would practice black magic within the village. The responses that 
she engenders—rage, fear, devotion, affection, and even sexual attraction—are 
multi-faceted and paradoxical in nature.22 Different Balinese people (and the 
Fig. 15. Author as Dalem Bedahulu (Courtesy 
Ernestina Koetting)
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same people on different occasions) 
have very different reactions to and 
associations with her presence, and her 
“meaning” can be tinkered with, both 
dramaturgically and socially.  
In Western iconography and 
performance, this internal image of 
the body is most frequently displayed 
either as the Devil or in closely related 
images, such as the Hellmouth from 
which demons appear or the Witch 
(see figs. 16 and 17). While the 
Balinese Rangda is dangerous but 
necessary—and ultimately beyond 
moral judgment—the Christian 
attitude toward the Devil is, at 
least officially, one of contempt and 
negation, matching an oft-expressed 
disregard for the body itself. The Greek nature god, Pan, with his cloven hooves and 
goat’s horns, in this case, has been transformed into the grotesque and malevolent 
embodiment of all that is evil. But attraction to the body is not easily erased, 
and the devil becomes celebrated as 
the antihero of pre-Lenten Carnival 
processions: a time, fittingly, when the 
body is given temporary reprieve and 
when masks of wildmen, witches, and 
leering Satan himself still runs riot in 
some European and Latin American 
streets.
A fascinating Carnivalesque 
recuperation of the Devil, and, through 
his image, of the body itself, is played 
out in the “Días Patrias” celebration 
of Mexican independence in the small 
town of Teloloapan in Guerrero, 
Mexico.23 Here, as, more ambiguously, 
elsewhere in Mexico, devil masks have 
provided not only a phantasmagoric 
screen for all that is seemingly 
antisocial, but also a vehicle for recuperating images of fertility and the abundance 
of nature that characterized precontact art. When the Spanish monks came into “New 
Fig. 16. Krampus (Devil) mask, Austria (© John 
Emigh)
Fig. 17. Hexe (Witch) mask, Weil-der-Stadt, Baden 
Württenberg, Germany (© John Emigh)
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Spain,” they found active 
performance cultures, 
complete with masks 
represent ing deif ied 
jaguars and aspects of 
nature; some of these 
masks may easily be 
regarded as variants of 
the “archetype” being 
described. These gods and 
their iconography were, 
the monks catechized, 
really aspects of the devil 
and, as such, must be 
scorned as the enemy of 
the true God. Morality plays were introduced, pitting the life of Christian virtue 
against the lure of el Diablo, and often featuring striking variants of European devil 
masks that folded in precontact imagery. Mesoamerican belief systems, though, did 
not adapt easily to such a Manichean dualism, and the devil has remained a figure 
of great and ambivalent fascination throughout Mexico (see fig. 18). 
During the Mexican War of Independence in 1812, Vincente Guerrero and his 
ragtag group of revolutionaries in the rugged hill country around Teloloapan—a 
region also distinguished as the birth place and final resting place of Cauhtemoc, 
the last Aztec king—were badly outnumbered and outgunned by advancing troops 
from the capital of Mexico City. One of the rebel soldiers, Pedro Asencia Alquiciras, 
devised a plan to gather together the devil masks in the region, make more of these 
masks, and then don them, emerging from behind trees as an army of demons just 
as the loyalist troops approached. The ruse is said to have worked spectacularly, 
sending the pro-Spanish troops fleeing for their lives. Ever since, the mask of the 
devil has become a symbol of independence and patriotism in the region, and the 
wearing of these masks, often painted with the Mexican national colors, a regular 
feature of Independence Day celebrations in Teloloapan.24 
As the years and a series of revolutions and their betrayals ensued, other legends 
accrued to these patriotic devil masks, frequently having to do with the courtship of 
young ladies facilitated by the masks’ anonymity.25 In Teloloapan, as elsewhere in 
Mexico, devil masks have provided not only a phantasmagoric screen for all that is 
seemingly antisocial, but also a vehicle for recuperating images of fertility and the 
abundance of nature. It is not at all unusual in Mexican performances to see toads 
and snakes—traditionally positive images in Mesoamerican cultures—adorn these 
brightly painted devil masks. In Teloloapan, though, something else has happened. 
The masks have grown larger and larger (some now weigh as much as seventy-five 
Fig. 18. Diablos resting at New Year’s Day celebrations, Janitzio, 
Michoacan, Mexico (© John Emigh)
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pounds); multiple sheep, 
goat, and cattle horns have 
erupted from the diabolic 
heads; and the noses, 
chins and cheekbones 
have themselves sprouted 
multiple heads of jaguars, 
eagles, and snakes. These 
figures of rugged and 
untamed abundance are 
made,  purchased,  or 
rented by young men who 
don leather cowboy robes 
and walk through the street, shaking hands with small children, “capturing” willing 
young women, dancing with these women and with each other, and matching their 
skills with a whip against those who would dare challenge them (see fig. 19). In the 
town square (zócalo)—so important to Mexican city architecture and life—these 
young men, still wearing their cumbersome and colorful masks, stage contests 
of cowboy skills no longer necessary for the semi-urban life of the town. “What 
terrible devils! What heroic devils!” shouts the master of ceremonies during the 
presentation. They snap their long whips, or chicotes, strut and roar proudly with 
their phantasmagoric masks, and are judged by the festival queen and her court, 
proudly touted by the announcer as “representatives of the grace and beauty of 
Mexican culture.” A sort of beauty-and-the-beast dance follows, with the queen, 
her court, and small girls all dancing with the devils. Still rough around the edges, 
the Diablos of Teloloapan have acquired culture, it seems: a cultured devil has 
become the very image of the ideal Guerrero male. 
I have suggested that Rangda in Bali, the patriotic Diablos of Teloloapan, and 
their many cousins around the world owe their iconographic similarities to the 
shared architecture of the somatosensory system in human brains and that they are, 
perhaps first and foremost, images of pure, unmediated sensation. But they are also 
many things more, collecting and dispersing meanings in the marginal times of 
performance. Cultural construction still has a significant role to play in encoding 
and decoding these interior images of the body, re-presented in the visual field of 
performative play. Some of the images that share this archetypical iconography are 
understood to be protective and ultimately positive, others wholly negative. Some 
reference beasts of prey, real and imagined, others seem to be grotesques of the 
human face, without links to the animal world. Some are specifically “feminine,” 
while others are “masculine” or ambiguous. Some are more comic in affect than 
others. Many of these differences may be ascribed to cultural constructions affecting 
the value and role afforded bodily sensation, the closeness of perceived links to 
Fig. 19. A Teloloapan Diablo with his “chicote” (© John Emigh)
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other species, and the tensions around issues of gender and social status. Though 
the appeal of these figures may have a “universal” basis, the weightings of values 
in performance will vary from place to place, from time to time, and from person 
to person. 
“Cultures” are not static entities either. Beyond their (sometimes misleading) 
appeal as heuristic devices, they may be productively thought of as contested terrains. 
In so far as they are “things” at all, “cultures” exist as shared sets of concerns, 
images, and categories—some of these contradictory, some more entrenched than 
others, and all subject to change. Ultimately, cultural constructions must exist as 
constellations of neuron groups in the human brains of individuals, interconnected 
across distributed social networks. Thus, there may be predispositions (and 
resistances) to relating certain images and ideas, to connecting certain categorical 
groupings of neurons, to using the mind by invoking similar well-exercised 
pathways. It may prove useful to locate the symbolic webs of culture as more or 
less fragile constructions within the contested consciousness of the body-minded 
brain. Envisioning cultural constructions in this manner may provide a way of 
understanding their staying power, as well as their vulnerability. 
Making and viewing performances seem to be among the more productive and, 
potentially at least, the more pleasurable ways of giving form to these values as well 
as contesting their worth in a relatively safe space. The findings of neuroscience—
in their multiple and competing drafts—promise to provide a useful means of 
reminding us of the ways we are alike, as well as the ways in which, in constructing 
our own multiple drafts, we can be at odds: between cultures, and within our selves. 
Bracketing strips of behavior as performance—as somehow “re-presented” outside 
of the driven flow of causally chained actions and responses that constitute (or 
seem to constitute) everyday life—provides a way of externalizing the internal 
process by which disparate cues are assigned and reassigned meanings. These cues, 
given new significance by their selection and presentation to the view of others 
as percepts destined for signification, set off complex chain reactions of electrical 
and chemical activities dashing about axons and dendrites, catching meanings in 
margins and, through both predictable and unpredictable bisociative connections, 
enforcing and breaking apart categorical constructions, looping back into memory, 
provoking bursts of laughter or fleeting moments of comprehension, and, ultimately, 
changing the ways in which we can view the world and the configuration of the 
neurons that must make sense of the viewing.  
There is some evidence, on display at conferences such as those recently held 
at Bucknell and the University of Pittsburgh and in a growing body of literature, 
that our modest but growing comprehension of how the brain works will span the 
sciences and humanities, helping to break down the now outdated trope of “two 
cultures,” antithetically opposed. Perhaps it will also serve to reshape the trope 
(or “meme”) of culture itself, while we agree to disagree—with each other, with 
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ourselves, with the past, 
and with those others 
who essentially share 
our mental architecture. 
Performances serve 
to project the mind’s 
s k e t c h i n g  a n d 
p a r a d i g m - m a k i n g 
abilities out beyond 
the confines of the 
individual being, where 
other minds can assess 
the persuasiveness and 
power of our fleeting, 
embodied  v i s ions : 
affirming and denying, 
r e m e m b e r i n g  a n d 
forgetting, assimilating 
them into old categories, 
fo rg ing  new ones , 
blending fantasy and 
reality in fragile images 
inspired by our biological selves, reassigning neurons, shifting storage areas, 
strengthening weak synaptic connections and making new ones, rededicating 
neurons used to store information that has fallen into disuse, and maybe, if we are 
very lucky, using this process as a way to live better, or at least to enjoy the passage 
of our time here more fully (see fig. 20). 
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